

TS 116919/A  
Cy 2 of 5

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Staff/SI

SUBJECT : Section 6 of Coordination Staff Study

1. Attached is a revision of Section 6 of the subject document which deals with Electronics Intelligence - Telemetry. Sections of the original paper which we recommend deleting have been lined out and reworded sections have been inserted and underlined. Sections underlined with a broken line are from the original report but have been moved from their original context.

2. On page 2 of the attachment we have suggested a revision pertinent to the utilization of resources in the near future which could provide a stop gap prior to the availability of adequate collection and analysis capabilities. Further we have separated the collection problem from the analysis problems as the two cannot be compatibly resolved. It is felt that the resolution of the collection problem is the responsibility of DIRNSA, but the problem of analysis and the determination of the difference between the production of intelligence information and finished intelligence, is a problem that goes beyond his purview.

3. In the middle of page 3 we have tried to focus on the problem which is being considered by specifically pointing to those problems involving the Ad Hoc Task Group of the Critical Collection Priorities Committee.

4. At the bottom of page 3 we have lined out a paragraph as serving no particular purpose.

5. On page 4 we have addressed ourselves to the analysis problem as a separate entity and have made some suggestion for solution. Final recommendations in this area would come from the ELINT Committee who would be charged with this task.

6. On the handling of these complex operations which do not fall clearly under Third Party operations, NSCID 6 or NSCID 5 seem to be fully satisfactory at this time and present arrangements should be continued. The wording suggested would take care of this situation.

7. On pages 5 & 6 we have inserted the words "primarily" and "as appropriate" in order to recognize the nature of the problem involving CIA resources. These words are absolutely essential because of the fact that NSA cannot be privy to some of the operational activity in connection with CIA collection efforts. It is, therefore, necessary that CIA cooperate with, but not be unequivocally under control of NSA in these instances in order that all aspects be considered.

8. On page 7 the entire section has been lined out as we believe that the problem is recognized by the insertion on page 4. The discussion that exists on page 13 only serves to complicate the problem.



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Chief  
ELINT & Special Projects Division

Attachment:

Section 6 of Coordination Staff Study

Distribution:

Orig & 2 - Fwd (w/att.)

2 - ESPD

OSI/ESPD [redacted] (26 December 1961)

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*TAB A*

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